The EU Needs Its Own Armed Forces

In April, Russia massed its troops on Ukraine’s border, which drew both condemnation and concern over an escalation of the war in Ukraine. In May, Belarus forced a passenger plane to make an emergency landing on its territory in order to arrest a passenger on board. The act once again sparked condemnation, concern, and led to new economic sanctions, but similar military posturing is unlikely to end here either. Long-lasting peace is not a given, and events like these on Europe’s periphery send a clear message about how insignificant the continent’s capacity to respond with direct force is perceived to be. Although the EU is the world’s second wealthiest institution, militarily speaking it is smaller than the sum of its parts. Our allies, competitors, and adversaries all recognize this. If Finland and Europe want to endure into the distant future, the time has come for us to build the foundation of a defense covering all of Europe as soon as possible.

EU member states have their own branches of the armed forces, and naturally national pride is attached to them. But what would happen if the continent as a whole came under the influence of a hostile actor? Member states have traditionally built their defenses on the following logic: if the home country were to become the target of an attack, we would respond to its defense ourselves. In today’s reality, however, we would hardly find ourselves in a situation where, for example, Sweden became the target of an attack while Denmark, Finland, or France remained unaffected. Both the Treaty of Lisbon and plain common sense would obligate us to help our fellow member state. It is precisely this pooling of strength that makes the EU so powerful: it would be dismal to find that defense had been left out of that equation, leaving us with a Europe that in theory possesses one of the largest and most powerful military forces in the world, but one that is scattered among member states into their own weaker chambers.

The standardization and unification of European forces has for a long time already been handled primarily by NATO, and through it, the USA. This, in turn, has caused many European countries to trust that when they whistle, America will indeed come to the rescue. But what if America doesn’t help, and NATO’s required declaration of war remains just a gesture without action? Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO’s own identity has remained an open question, as NATO countries are no longer united by the Soviet threat and the need to be able to destroy it. It has been replaced by a wavering alliance in which members such as Greece and Turkey are at each other’s throats, and the USA, in the name of standardization, sells its own military solutions to other NATO members. The 45th President of the United States, Donald Trump, made it very clear through his actions that Europe should no longer trust that the USA will always and forever be a global actor. In order to survive, NATO needs a strengthening organization alongside it—it needs the EU’s armed forces.

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), launched in 2017, is an EU mechanism driving military integration between member states, and it creates an encouraging foundation for a credible EU defense. By integrating member states’ equipment, EU members can negotiate equipment production with unified strength, in a manner similar to what was done with COVID-19 vaccines. This would give all member states greater purchasing power compared to conducting equipment negotiations individually. Nor should the economic position of a more self-sufficient arms industry be overlooked: the EU’s internal market already has respected equipment manufacturers, and the strategic utilization of these would be of paramount importance. This integration would unify the EU’s defense and create a whole capable of striking with real force when necessary. Once the chains of command, in addition to equipment, are also standardized within the EU, a Finnish soldier too could be deployed with minimal difficulty to help another member state in a time of need, without the problems created by differences in command structure.

The building blocks of EU defense already exist, in their own right, in the EU’s rapid reaction forces and in Permanent Structured Cooperation. The delicate merging of these two functions is where we still have work to do, so that the rapid reaction forces can form the backbone of the EU’s peacetime defense, and PESCO can ensure that European forces are able to operate together with complementary equipment. As long as we remain fragmented, we will be exposed to military posturing at the EU’s external border. As long as we place our blind faith in the idea that America will always be ready to fight in Europe, we turn our gaze away from NATO’s decline and subject ourselves to the authority of another power. The only sustainable solution is for the EU to guarantee its own security by taking the necessary steps toward the union’s own armed forces. If we fail to do so, individual member states will eventually be cut off one by one like loose branches, instead of us standing together like a fortress—solid and unyielding.

Author: Antti Stoor.

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