Internal and external threats

As Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership draws closer, it would be easy to think that now, if ever, the EU adds no military value at all. It is worth remembering, however, that NATO and the EU do not map exactly onto one another in their memberships: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro are not EU members, and Ireland, Austria, Cyprus and Malta, as well as Finland and Sweden at the time of writing, are not NATO members.

The EU can bring considerable added benefit alongside NATO, for example as a provider of joint defence procurement and other shared capabilities, which can be delivered either within the framework of permanent structured cooperation or between all member states. Although NATO is Europe’s principal defence solution, it is not all-encompassing, and mechanisms can be created alongside it through which Europe can take greater responsibility for its own defence and for funding it, independently of other NATO member states. EU-level investment in common defence brings economies of scale based on size and offers opportunities to make defence spending more efficient. The EU can also facilitate the movement of soldiers and military equipment between member states, and strengthen members’ security of supply through the single market and joint preparedness arrangements.

In 2017 the European Union created the framework for EU-wide and cross-border defence cooperation in research and development, which resulted in the European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2021. In addition, in July 2022 the European Commission approved a proposal by the European Parliament and the European Council to strengthen the European defence industry, which includes EUR 500 million in funding for the most urgent and critical defence procurement, preventing member states from competing for the same acquisitions and enabling cost savings.

• NATO and the EU do not map exactly onto one another in their memberships.
• EU-level investment in common defence brings economies of scale based on size and offers opportunities to make defence spending more efficient.
• The EU’s common defence reduces its dependence on other NATO countries.

Although it is worth remembering that member states bear the immediate, first-line responsibility to respond to various threats, the EU has a supporting, coordinating role through decisions that generally concern either part or all of the EU. The EU handles, for example, humanitarian aid and civil protection for the victims of conflicts and disasters, but there are also many threat-specialised organisations operating at the European level that are separate from the EU.

The EU has responded to crises with varying success, but in recent years it has shown particular strength in the face of direct threats. This is a welcome development, because the gravest threats are so large that preparing for and responding to them cannot sensibly, or even safely, be left to the responsibility of individual member states.

At the start of the coronavirus pandemic, the activation of the EU’s civil protection mechanism and the channelling of research funds into coronavirus research were decided as early as January 2020. In addition, the EU took part in the joint procurement of protective equipment and vaccines. On 24 February, the day the full-scale war in Ukraine began, the EU Council adopted personal and economic sanctions against Russia. The Commission also granted additional funding for emergency aid programmes. The rapid response to the war in Ukraine in particular took even many cynics by surprise.

It should also be remembered that the EU funds research and innovation partly directed at future threats through various funding frameworks, such as for new, emerging pandemics. These can be explored in more detail through the Innovation Radar.

What matters with threats is that member states have sufficient common understanding of the severity of a threat and of how to respond to it. Increasing the use of qualified majority voting would be one way to ensure that, in the face of a serious threat, a single member state cannot block effective joint action.

• The gravest threats are so large that preparing for and responding to them cannot sensibly, or even safely, be left to the responsibility of individual member states.
• In recent years the EU has shown particular strength in the face of direct threats.

International agreements and the EU’s legislation on refugee policy are outdated and do not meet the needs of the modern world. Some of the EU’s external border states are forced to bear a disproportionately large share of the responsibility for receiving and processing asylum seekers, which is an extremely difficult situation both for those states and for the asylum seekers themselves. In practice, the same would happen to the border states even without the EU. The EU’s toolkit in refugee policy is currently negligible, because member states have not agreed to give the Union sufficient competence in the matter. It would be in everyone’s interest for the EU’s broader shoulders to be used in the smooth accommodation, processing and integration of asylum seekers. This would, however, require a change to the current refugee policy.